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When and where does one’s life begin? Where do the corporeal 
boundaries of the fetus and pregnant woman reside? What kind of 
implications do the regulatory mechanisms of classification, which 
demarcate the boundary of personhood, have in gender dynamics in 
society? While the advancement of scientific knowledge is generally 
believed to bring about more answers to fundamental questions of our 
bodies, it seems it also poses more questions than the answers it provides. 
With advancement of biomedical knowledge and technologies, we have 
gained more control over both the beginning and end of life, but this has 
also challenged our perception of life and personhood. 
 In regards to the beginning of life, knowledge about the process of 
pregnancy led to various methods of birth control, which allowed many 
women to take control over reproduction (Ross and Salinger 2017; May 
2010). Furthermore, a number of treatments were introduced for men 
and women who face reproductive challenges (Harwood 2007; Spar 2006). 
Biomedical technology also enabled the birth of a human without male 
and female intercourse or a legally recognized mother carrying the fetus 
to term; egg and sperm donation (Almeling 2007; 2011) and surrogacy 
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(Markens 2007; Teman 2010; Twine 2011) are gaining recognition as 
legitimate means for reproduction in some countries. This is not to suggest, 
however, that there is a consensus on the notion of genesis of life, or 
accepted means of reproductive medicine. 
While increasing awareness of reproductive rights allowed more 
people (particularly women) to take control over their reproductive 
decisions, including termination of unwanted pregnancy, expanded 
recognitions of “the fetal citizen” appeared as a counter narrative. Such 
notion was legally institutionalized in countries including Ireland, where 
the government constitutionalized rights to life for the fetus in 1983, 
granting equal rights to life for the fetus and the pregnant woman. 
Other countries, including Hungary, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Madagascar, Paraguay, and the Philippines followed, 
by including “fetal rights” in their constitutions (de Londras 2015:243). In 
anti-abortion narratives, the uterus came to be treated as if it were a 
public arena and the fetuses are regarded not just as persons, but right-
bearing citizens (McCulloch 2012). In Poland, for example, abortion was 
declared unconstitutional, treating the fetus as the “purest citizen,” 
whose rights would weigh more than those of the women (Holc 2004). 
This resonates with anti-abortion rhetoric in the United States. Although 
the United States does not constitutionally grant personhood to the fetus, 
those who are against abortion often base their argument on the notion 
of fetal personhood. Claims for fetal rights establishes fetus’ “independent 
relationship with the state that bypasses the pregnant woman” (Roth 
2000:3). 
In contemporary Japanese society, abortion debates do not take 
central roles in public discourse as they do in other parts of the world, 
but issues surrounding reproduction are far from uncontroversial. There 
are debates on reproductive technologies, and the consequences of the 
2
readily accessible information produced from them. In recent years, an 
increasing number of people take the noninvasive prenatal genetic testing 
(NIPT), which allowed medical professionals to detect the chance of genetic 
abnormalities with mere blood test. According to the report by the NIPT 
Consortium, 46,645 women took NIPT between April 2013 and March 
2017, of which 803 people received the positive result. 675 women took 
further examination for confirmation, and among 605 women who received 
positive results, 567 (94%) chose abortion (Asahi Newspaper, September 16, 
2017). Critics argue that medical professionals have women take such an 
exam without fully preparing them to face the results. A study suggests 
that women who underwent NIPT had higher score for depression and 
anxiety compared to those who did not (Suzumori et al. 2014). Genetic 
counseling is available for those who elect such exam, but this is about 
briefing of medical information, and not about ameliorating mental and 
psychological stress pregnant women experience in relation to the testing 
and their results (Wada 2014). Others are concerned that such screening 
functions as a form of eugenics. The Network for Neuromuscular Disorder 
(Shinkei Kinshikkan Nettowāku) publicly denounced the practice of such 
testing, along with the use of preimplantation genetic screening (PGS), in 
the process in vitro fertilization. 
In the field of infertility treatment, ones that include the third person’s 
involvement are particularly controversial. Infertility treatment using 
medical students’ sperm donation began in Japan as early as 1948, and 
children born with such procedures started to question the legitimacy of 
such process, arguing for children’s rights to know the donor and their 
genetic heritage (Tsuge 2003). Gestational surrogacy is another contested 
practice (Semba 2008). There is no legal guideline or regulation on this, 
while the Japan Society of Obstetrics and Gynecology has professional 
guideline of not allowing the use of such reproductive assistance (Position 
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on the Surrogate Conception, Japan Society of Obstetrics and Gynecology, 
2003). There have been a few reported cases of surrogacy in Japan, but 
with relative lack of availability and acceptance at the societal level, 
most of those who seek such services in Japan go overseas (Hibino 2016). 
Especially the case that involved celebrities received tremendous media 
attention in the early 2000s and sparked debates over ethical concerns as 
well as the definition of legal parents and the meaning of the family. 
Contentious issues surrounding bodies have been debated primarily 
in the field of bioethics, playing a significant role in policy debates. While 
poststructuralists are typically not considered as major contributors 
in the field of bioethics, they provide powerful tools to deconstruct the 
fundamental assumptions and regulatory mechanisms behind various 
forms of classification. They also offer potential directions in which we can 
theorize matters that are so fundamental to our lives. 
Based primarily upon the ideas presented by the leading feminist 
philosopher on the body, Elizabeth Grosz, this paper examines the 
possibilities that allow us to expand our conceptualization of the bodies 
in transformation, exploring how to account for perpetual change of the 
body. The phrase “bodies in transformation” can be considered redundant, 
as technically speaking, every body is in transformation. Yet, some types 
of bodily transformations have more political stakes than others, and I will 
highlight the bodies whose change has tremendous amount of political and 
moral stakes. This paper focuses on the bodies around reproduction: the 
pregnant body, the male body, and the fetal body.  
I will begin the discussion with the dominant approach taken in 
scholarly work to studying the body. In particular, I will engage with 
the conceptualization of the body based on Cartesian dualism, and discuss 
its critiques and alternative perspectives. Following that, the paper will 
focus on the questions of the bodies surrounding reproduction. Engaging 
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with and problematizing Cartesian dualism, I will analyze the ways in 
which gendered bodies and the fetus appear in discourses surrounding 
reproduction. I will further explore possible ways in which production can 
be theorized beyond the assumption rooted in Cartesian dualism.
Cartesian dualism and scientific production of knowledges 
about the body
In the theorization of the body, Descartes’ distinction between soul 
and nature, and the parallel contrast of mind (thinking substance) and body 
(extended substance) have played an influential role. These categories 
were considered mutually exclusive and the mind/soul was detached from 
the body/nature (Grosz 1994:6). Accordingly, the body has been squarely 
positioned in the realm of science as a knowable object, and it has been 
largely neglected as a subject of analysis in humanity and social sciences 
for a number of years. This exclusive reliance on science in questions 
around bodies resulted in the hegemonic belief that the most “accurate” 
answer to the conundrum of bioethics can be found in science, in which 
knowledge is frequently treated as objective and disinterested. 
Science does not operate outside the social, however (Bijker et al. 
1987). As Grosz states, “The sciences themselves are not immune to – 
indeed, they depend for the very mode of their formulations and operations 
on – everyday assumptions and beliefs of scientists and others regarding 
knowledge, power, desire and bodies” (1994:x). Similarly, the philosopher 
Brian Massumi writes, “From the very beginning, science operates in 
investigative contexts that are highly culturally, socially, and economically 
predetermined” (2002:236). 
Grosz and Massumi both argue that nature (bodily movement and 
sensation) and culture (products of the mind; knowledge) cannot be 
theorized separately. Massumi insists on the continuity of culture and 
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nature, and points out that in order for researchers to claim their finding 
to be scientific, they have to artificially impose cutoff points between 
nature and culture (2002:237) so that they can argue that their research 
has nothing to do with the realm of culture. 
The questioning of science-centrism and destabilizing of the nature-
culture binary also entails a problematization of other interrelated binaries, 
including the body and the mind. In this line of thinking, the body is no 
longer a mere container of the mind; we cannot consider the mind and 
body, or the physiological and the psychological, as separate or in causal 
relations (Melreau-Ponty 1962). Perception requires both the body and the 
mind, and experience and perception can never be detached from their 
relation within space. Perception and thinking can be accomplished only 
through the body. In short, the mind is always embodied and embedded. 
Foucault introduced another critical view in our understanding of the 
body; one of his central contributions in the scholarship of the body is his 
attention to the working of power. Introducing the concept of biopower, 
Foucault demonstrated that our bodies are not free-floating material 
containers of our mind that are independent from the environment. He 
demonstrated the ways in which our bodily behaviors are constantly 
monitored, regulated, and managed in our everyday lives (Foucault:1978). 
One thing Foucault did not discuss in his discussion of the body, however, 
was gender dynamics. The hierarchical conception of body/mind is aligned 
with different types of hierarchy based on social categories of differences, 
including gender. While male-embodied-persons are signified with their 
consciousness and culture, female-embodied-persons are reduced to their 
“unique” physical characteristics and function around reproduction. 
Even within feminist scholarship, critical engagement with the body 
did not happen until the 1990s. This was in large part due to response to 
“the pervasively misogynistic treatment of women’s bodies, and to various 
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patriarchal attempts to reduce women to their bodies when these bodies 
have been conceived in the most narrowly functionalist and reductionist 
terms” (Grosz 1991:1). When it comes to the body, many took the assumption 
of Cartesian dualism without challenging it. Even though the very struggle 
of women comes from their bodily features that culturally and socially 
define them as female, there has been a tendency even among feminists to 
assume the Cartesian dualism and the subordination of the body to the mind. 
As Grosz points out, in feminist literature, “the body is typically regarded 
as passive and reproductive but largely unproductive, an object over which 
struggles between its ‘inhabitant’ and others/exploiters may be possible” 
(1994:9). In particular, egalitarian feminists saw bodies as something that 
limits women to gain equality; for them, bodies are something they need to 
erase and overcome. Many of them also took it for granted the goodness 
of the scientific advancement, seeing it as a something that “frees” women 
from reproductive functions. The assumption that was the foundation of 
patriarchy was so pervasive that the challenging of such ideas did not 
happen until relatively recently.
Ontology of reproduction? 
 It is the edge of virtual, where it leaks into actual, that counts. For that 
seeping edge is where potential, actually, is found (Massumi 2002:43).
Reproduction is one of the areas that could benefit from further 
theorization of the body. Pregnancy and the genesis of life is a complex 
process, which involves the destabilization of what is perceived as 
individuals’ bodily boundaries. Sexual intercourse involves mixing of fluids, 
which already threatens the images of insular self (Davis 1983; Zerubavel 
1991:38). Pregnancy challenges the modern notion of subject that is 
atomistic, autonomous, self-contained, insular, and coherent. In discourses 
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around reproduction, however, there is a tendency to focus solely on the 
fetus or the body of pregnant women. While, for example, bioethicists 
tend to focus on the moral status of the embryo and fetus, feminists tend 
to focus on women’s experience in pregnancy. Analytically speaking, it is 
possible to consider a pregnant woman’s body and her fetus separately, 
and perhaps, such approach can be more effective than otherwise for 
political purposes. The modern notion of autonomous personhood allows 
such imagination possible. In the attempt of making complex processes 
intelligible, manageable and controllable, we split continuous process into 
various discrete “stages” and contain it in the specific location, the womb, 
which is being abstracted and discursively displaced from women’s lived 
body. 
However, by definition, reproduction involves both the body that 
reproduces and the body that is reproduced. Empirically, the emergence of 
new life still requires a maternal body (after all, the fantasy of ectogenesis 
has not been materialized, and even if it will be, it is hard to imagine that 
such machines would completely replace female reproductive “functions” 
in the near future). Another thing we must remember is that reproduction 
requires both an egg and a sperm, even though the source of a sperm, a 
man, is largely invisible in discourses surrounding reproduction. 
As Massumi argues, we cannot separate time and space in 
conceptualizing our bodies and bodily transformations. This is particularly 
so in the processes of reproduction. We cannot erase temporality, select 
a convenient moment for a political agenda, and locate the beginning of 
life in one specific bodily location. What we need is a way to conceptualize 
reproduction beyond such a static model. To do this, we need to overcome 
our desire to locate the beginning and the end of our bodies – both spatially 
(where it begins and where it ends) and temporally (when it begins and 
when it ends). As Massumi insists, “Geometrically, a body is a “space-filling 
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fractal” of a “fourth” dimensionality” (2002:202). He elaborates: 
 The mouth connects through the stomach and intestines to fold back 
out the anus. This is one leaky “box.” It’s closer to a Klein bottle: a two 
dimensional topological figure… We do not live in Euclidean Space. 
We live between dimensions (2002:203). 
The bodily dynamics around reproduction may be unthinkable within 
the framework of the modern notion of personhood. Potentiality invokes 
anxiety because it is uncontrollable and open-ended, and it goes against 
our desire to have everything controllable, predictable, and calculable. This 
may be considered to be threatening because it destabilizes the notion of 
corporeal limit and reveals the contradiction of the modern subjectivity.
Gendered bodies
The idea of the modern subject with a clear corporeal limit was a 
powerful notion, an illusion and taken-for-granted privilege available only 
for the few, at expense of others who were not allowed such imaginary. As 
Judith Butler states, “The ‘coherence’ and ‘continuity’ of ‘the person’ are 
not logical or analytic features of personhood, but rather, socially instituted 
and maintained norms of intelligibility” (1990:23). How exactly does this 
play out in the politics of reproduction? 
Discourse surrounding reproduction entails multiple layers of paradox. 
In order to formulate a way to conceptualize reproduction based on the 
notion of bodies that are constantly in a state of transformation, we need to 
first understand the ways in which gendered bodies have been imagined. 
Here I will first touch on Grosz discussion of the female bodies, and move 
on to problematize one of the paradoxes I feel as critical; the invisibility 
and centrality of men’s corporeality in discourses around reproduction. 
That is, while seminal fluid is seen as an active producer of the fetus, male 
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subject (male bodies and their behaviors) escapes from examination, when 
it comes to the discussion of reproduction.
Female bodies
Grosz observes that women’s corporeality is characterized with the 
flow, seepage, and liquidity, whose uncontrollable nature poses threats to 
the order. According to Grosz, the girls’ transition to adulthood begins 
when they began menstruating and developing breasts, which signifies 
motherhood and reproductive capacities, rather than sexual maturity. It is 
“the beginning of an out-of-control status that she was led to believe ends 
with childhood” (Grosz 1994:205). If women’s corporeality is inscribed with 
its out-of-control status and it begins with menstruation and development 
of breasts, it would be safe to assume it reaches its peak at pregnancy, 
during which the body is filled with fluid, viscous, and half-formed matter 
that represent uncertainty and ambiguity, and invokes fear and disgust.  
Empirical research on gender and embodiment support her argument. 
The boundaries of the pregnant body are constantly in flux, as Draper 
(2003:749) described it as being “unbounded,” and a number of studies have 
revealed that that women experienced pregnancy and childbirth as the 
period in which they lose control over their bodies (Carter 2010; Warren 
and Brews 2004). In particular, pregnant women often feel that they 
cannot keep the bodily boundaries intact with potential leakage in various 
forms, including increasing amount of sweat, vomit from morning sickness, 
colostrum from breasts, and breaking of water (Longhurst 2000:15). Indeed, 
taboos surrounding the body tended to be around its openings “where fluid 
enters and exit” (Zerubavel 1991:38), and public display of such incident is 
particularly feared.  
Pregnancy and childbirths are also the time when many women 
experience changing sense of self and embodiment. As Marion Iris Young 
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(1990:46) describes, 
 She [a pregnant woman] experiences her body as herself and not 
herself. Its inner movements belong to another being, yet they are not 
other, because her body boundaries shift and because her bodily self-
location is focused on her trunk in addition to her head. 
Longhurst echoes, noting, “Pregnant women undergo a bodily process that 
transgresses the boundary between inside and outside, self and other, one 
and two, subject and object” (2000:55). 
Coming to terms with this “one but not one” status of pregnancy can 
be challenging in society where it is assumed that one mind resides in one 
body.  Lupton and Shmied (2013) suggested that the intense corporeality 
of the infant coming out of the body allow those who had vaginal birth 
without anesthesia to grapple with and resolve such embodiment, whereas 
those who gave birth with a Caesarean section tend to experience the 
sense of alienation, struggling to fully grasp the reality of the infant being 
born. 
While women feel that they lose control over their bodies during 
pregnancy, they also experience heightened sense of responsibility to exert 
control over their bodies. They receive (unwanted) comments, advice, and 
even touch by others, reinforcing the notion that their bodies are considered 
semi-public property (Longhurst 2005). In Japan, medical discourse stresses 
the significance of pregnant women’s physical health and behavior as 
primary contributor (rather than genetic and other biological factors), 
affecting the health of the fetus (Tsipy 2007). Women feel responsible to 
monitor and manage their body so that they could carry their pregnancy 
to term successfully, protecting the preborn person inside them (Lupton 
2012; Wetterberg 2004). Ettorre refers to such self-sacrificing acts during 
pregnancy as “reproductive asceticism” (2009:246). This notion begins even 
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before the pregnancy, as Karpin (2010) critically explained with the notion 
that women feel pressure to protect “pre-conceived embryo.”  
The fetus’s physical separation from its maternal body at delivery does 
not necessarily suggest the end of the blurred boundaries between the 
mother and her child. Acts of care, most notably, breastfeeding gives the 
sense of “interembodiment” for mothers (Lupton 2013). While breastfeeding 
has been celebrated as the symbol of intimacy and connection between the 
mother and her infant and some women do experience such connection 
in positive manners, others resented it as unwanted constant demand 
of feeding, which was experienced with the “feeling of encroachment of 
body/self” (Shmied and Lupton 2001:245). Shmied and Lupton (2001:245) 
continued that 
 In their accounts of devourment, intrusion and alienation, the demands 
of their bodies made by their babies and the uncertain or blurred 
boundaries between a mother and her breastfeeding baby were 
experienced as intolerable. These women sought to regain control 
over their lives, over their bodies, to regain their sense of autonomous 
self. For many women, there was comfort in a return to a dualist 
understanding of mind and body, self and Other.
The notion that the pregnant body being out-of-control can also be 
observed from the fact that being fit during the postpartum period is 
typically described as “getting the body back” (Dworkin and Wachi 2004; 
Earle 2003; Upton and Hans 2003). 
Male Bodies 
In contrast to female bodies and their out-of-control status, the male 
body is seen as autonomous, atomistic, and under control. In terms of 
reproduction, Grosz wrote that “seminal fluid is understood primarily as 
12
what it makes, what it achieves, a causal agent and thus a thing, a solid” 
(1994:199). Such view can be found as early as the time of Aristotle, who 
considered maternal body as passive formless matter to which more 
concrete specific contour, the sperm, enters (Aydemir 2007). 
Descartes famously theorized the notion of the mind-body dualism, 
but even before that, there was widely accepted notion in Europe that 
consciousness was part of male reproductive role. Anatomical drawings 
of genital system of the male body by Leonardo Da Vinci represent the 
widely accepted notion on reproduction in his time (Noble et al. 2014).  His 
drawing from sometime between 1480 and 1492 showed two ducts in the 
penis, one of which was connected with the testes, while another being 
connected to the spinal cord. Noble et al. (2014:3) explained that it was 
based on “the idea that there was direct connection from the nervous 
system, from the brain through the spinal cord, to the penis, perhaps so 
that an essential component of the male seed, presumably originating in 
the brain, could be transmitted during intercourse.”
In the history of Western science, the central role of the male 
reproductive materials did not change until relatively recently. That is, 
the notion of preformation (i.e., the semen contained preformed human, or 
homunculus) was dominant until the eighteenth century, when its influence 
was replaced with the theory of epigenesis, which explained the beginning 
of life with cell differentiation and the formation of organs (Pinto-Correia 
1997). 
Even with such drastic change in scientific understanding of 
reproduction, however, it appears that not much has changed in terms of 
people’s popular imagination since the time of Aristotle. Emily Martin’s 
(1991) study of medical texts revealed the ways in which eggs and sperms 
were anthromorphized, reflecting upon gendered norms and stereotypes 
in the broader society. Sperm was characterized with heroic activity, while 
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eggs were said to be passive.
The assumptions of a man as the active producer, as well as the notion 
of seminal fluid as the core of the emerging individual remain pervasive. 
Paradoxically, however, in the discussion of reproduction, male bodies 
are almost always absent. This dynamic can be observed even in the 
commodification of reproductive materials. In her study of egg agencies 
and sperm banks in the US, Rene Almeling (2007; 2011) demonstrated 
that eggs and sperms have been commodified differently with differing 
expectations imposed to male and female donors. While the process of egg 
donation involves the element of emotional labor, and expects altruism 
and “maternal characteristics” from donors, basic requirements for sperm 
donors are mostly based on the “quality” of the sperm. 
The question of male bodies remains largely unanswered. Even in 
the general discussion of the body, specificity of male bodies is rarely 
interrogated. Grosz states: 
 Perhaps the great mystery, the great unknown, of the body comes 
not from the peculiarities and enigmas of female sexuality, from the 
cyclically regulated flows that emanate from women’s bodies, but from 
the unspoken and generally unrepresented particularities of the male 
body… [T]he specificities of the masculine have always been hidden 
under the generality of the universal, the human… Thus what remains 
unanalyzed, what men can have no distance on, is the mystery, the 
enigma, the unspoken of the male body (1994:198).
The absence of men from discussions of reproduction may seem 
strange at first glance, given the centrality of seminal fluid in the 
masculine imagination of reproduction. However, with the idea of the body 
as an autonomous and insular entity, even sexual intercourse cannot be 
adequately theorized. Thus, it is necessary that the battle of reproduction 
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is contained and fought in a pregnant women’s body. Accordingly, 
responsibility around reproduction, including contraception, is applied 
almost exclusively to women’s behaviors. 
The invisibility of privilege is evident here. Ray Chow argued that 
even when stories were narrated by the female protagonists, the narrative 
center could be the white man whose power was invisible and unchallenged 
(2002:164). A similar dynamic can be observed here. Even though seminal 
fluid is said to represent the creation of new life, reproduction is discursively 
positioned in the realm of the feminine. Reproduction is discussed as 
women’s issues, and men are detached from the discourse, and at times 
treated as if they are irrelevant for reproduction. This does not mean that 
they are excluded from the narrative, however. In fact, while they are 
invisible in the discourse, it still works to their advantage, to keep their 
bodies clean and insular, and allow the masculine subject to remain as 
the narrative center. Difference is marked only on the female bodies, and 
specificity of the male bodies and male privilege remain invisible. While 
women’s sexuality, behaviors during pregnancy, and childrearing practices 
are publicly interrogated, men’s sexuality remains in the private sphere 
which is protected from the state intervention, and their participation in 
childrearing process is not considered as critical as that of women.  
Highlighting that reproduction entails both male and female bodies, 
and the destabilization of bodily boundaries, I have shown the contradiction 
of the modern notion of subjectivity and argued that we need a theory 
of bodies and reproduction that includes male bodies. It is ironic that 
reproductive activities had to be excluded in the theories of the body and 
the modern subject, even though the continuation of species was possible 
only through reproduction. 
The following sections will discuss the relationship between the 
pregnant woman and her fetus, but this time, I will focus on the working 
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of fetocentric rhetoric and displacement of women in the discourse 
around reproduction, by introducing a few empirical cases. I will then 
revisit Cartesian dualism and examine one of the notions relevant to 
the discussion of reproduction, namely, the binary of productivity and 
(unproductive) reproduction. I will problematize the narrow and gendered 
notion of productivity that is signified with the mind and the culture.
The contested status of the fetus
As I have discussed, there is the tendency of focusing either on the 
fetus or the woman. While femininity is typically defined with reproductive 
functions, when it comes to debates around reproduction or medicalized 
births as well as treatments, what occupies the center stage is frequently 
the fetus. Bioethical discussions frequently highlight the contested moral 
status of the fetus and embryo. Feminists have documented the ways 
in which the existence of the woman as a person becomes invisible in 
medicalized hospital births or in the use of various forms of reproductive 
technologies. In such situations, women’s bodies are seen as a vessel or a 
container. 
If a pregnant woman is a vessel, what it contains is fluid and viscous, 
and the core of the politics is how to define such highly ambiguous contents 
of the vessel. Needless to say, the definition of such an ambiguous being 
varies significantly cross-culturally and cross-historically. Today, rapidly 
advancing technology has made prenatal testing and antenatal screening 
widely available for many pregnant women, and images produced with these 
technologies have played significant role in shaping people’s perception of 
genesis of life. Most notably, the invention and improvement of sonography 
made the image of the fetus readily accessible, and it has encouraged the 
creation of the notion of the fetus as an individual (Petchesky 1987). These 
technologies have challenged ideas about personhood, the moral status of 
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the embryo and fetus, and women’s status as well as the notion of family 
(Sleeboom-Faulkner 2007:203). 
The result was the fetus “becoming a public figure with a life separate 
from the pregnant woman” (Isaacson 1996:460). While the fetus requires 
the pregnant woman’s body for its growth, her existence becomes invisible 
in the discourse of fetal personhood. Tracing the changes of language in 
the medical textbooks, Isaacson (1996) demonstrated that the concept of 
the fetus-infant emerged and gained acceptance as a scientific category. 
The creation of the category, fetus-infant was enabled by the erosion of 
the boundaries between infant and fetus, and the extension of infanthood 
to fetus-hood. In this framework, the fetus was conceptualized as a specific 
type of infant. What happened was the reorganization of classificatory 
scheme.
Fetocentric perspectives not only gives “rights” to the fetus, but also 
separates them from mother’s rights, and sees their relation as antagonistic 
(Hardacre 1997:4). Women’s bodies can be seen as even obstacle or danger 
in some case. For example, Casper (1997; 1998a; 1998b) documents the 
ways in which the patient of the treatment shift from a pregnant woman 
to the fetus in fetal surgery, in which physicians operate on the fetus while 
it is connected to a pregnant woman’s body. Casper points out how doctors 
see women’s bodies as a barrier they have to break through in order to 
reach their patient. While the procedure is highly invasive to a woman’s 
body, her altruism and the sense of sacrifice is expected and taken for 
granted in saving her “child.” 
Even when pregnant women do not experience a medical procedure, 
such as fetal surgery, she is constantly reminded that what she is carrying 
is an innocent and fragile person; women’s behaviors are monitored and 
placed under close surveillance. In the United States, a number of women 
who used illicit drugs while being pregnant have been prosecuted and 
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arrested for the reason of committing a form of child abuse and neglect 
(Humphrie 1999). The surveillance of pregnant women is of significant 
societal interest, and at times, clinical symptoms are created to enable such 
surveillance. The establishment of fetal alcoholic syndrome (FAS) is a case 
in point. Armstrong (1998; 2003) documents the process in which moral 
entrepreneurs constructed the clinical and moral diagnosis, revealing the 
questionable aspects of what is presented as scientific findings about FAS 
such as: the use of arbitrarily selected small number of cases as evidence; 
conflation of “alcoholism” and “alcohol use”; the use of religious texts as 
“historical evidence”; erasing of the possibilities that there are other factors 
affecting mental retardation and birth defect; use of authority as medical 
doctors; and establishment of the causal relation without scientifically 
rigorous research. What is evident in the rhetoric shown above is the 
appearance of fetal personhood and simultaneous disappearance of 
women’s personhood. 
Revisiting Cartesian dualism 
Frequently, critics of fetocentricism argue that in such settings women 
are treated as the container of the fetus; women are objectified and their 
personhood is stripped away. However, if we revisit the central thesis of 
Cartesian dualism and hierarchical alignment of mind and body, and male 
and female, it becomes clear that the container status of a pregnant woman 
does not start with her pregnancy. If we follow the logic of Cartesian 
dualism, the body is a container to begin with for both men and women, 
and it would be misleading to argue that women’s body ceases to become 
a mere container at the time of pregnancy and childbirth. The gender 
difference, then, is that while the mind is considered as the property of 
male social actors; women do not have access to it. Thus, while male 
body contains the mind, female body is empty if she is not pregnant. It 
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is not that the humanity of the woman is erased while her fetus gaining 
personhood. Rather, it does not exist to begin with. 
In Cartesian dualism, the mind is the only thing that produces. 
The mind is the only thing that signifies humanity. However, if we take 
reproduction seriously, we have to face the fact that bodies do produce. 
The reproduction is the process of bodies producing the very (potentiality 
of) a human. If reproduction is not the bodily production, what is it? While 
most of what bodies shed is considered abject (Kristeva 1982) and treated 
as dirt, an infant, as well as the breast milk that nurtures the infant, occupy 
their proper place, and they probably are some of the only non-abject 
“products” human can potentially shed from our body. Rather than treating 
reproduction as an exception, perhaps, we can begin the theory of the body 
from reproduction. 
Here, Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of the body becomes essential. As 
Grosz argues, in their view, “the body, bodies, flows in bodies rather than 
‘subjects,’ psychic beings, are what produce” (1994:181). This is a perspective 
which allows us to decenter the subject and deconstruct the subject-object 
binary aligned with that of the mind and the body. Everything we produce 
is produced by and through our bodies. With the focus on flows in bodies, 
it also enables the conceptualization of bodies as processes. 
If the ontology of reproduction can be theorized, it is the very process 
of the constant transformation and destabilization of bodily boundaries. 
Massumi states, “A thing is when it isn’t doing” (2002:6; emphasis in 
original). A thing is a matter in a static state. In order to capture a dynamic 
entity or process as a thing, we freeze both time and space. If ontology is 
about “what is” of a thing, we may not be able to capture the dynamics of 
human bodies using the idea of ontology, especially when the bodies are 
under tremendous transformation. Reproduction is not a thing. It is the 
very process of becoming. 
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Discussion and conclusion
Bringing bodies to the center of analysis, I have explored how Grosz’s 
theory would help us better approach questions about bodies around 
reproduction.  I began this paper by laying out the idea of Cartesian 
dualism and its critiques. In the following section, I moved on to the 
questions of reproduction. I have pointed out the tendency of focusing on 
either the fetus or women, and disappearance of men in the discussions 
around reproduction. 
I argued for the need of theories that allow us to engage with multiple 
bodies involved in reproduction, namely, men, women, and the potentiality 
of new life. I have relied upon Grosz’s observation of female corporeality 
that is inscribed as the mode of seepage, and extended the idea to the 
case of reproduction. I have also made an attempt to decipher the paradox 
around male bodies in reproduction; the active and agentic characteristics 
given to the images of sperms, and disappearance of men in the discourse 
of reproduction. 
I then shifted my focus on the contested status of the fetus, by 
introducing fetocentric perspectives observed in several empirical 
studies. Finally, I returned to the Cartesian dualism, which I have begun 
my paper with. I discussed the ways in which Cartesian dualism have 
enabled, informed and limited our imaginary about reproductive bodies, 
and explored how we can extend our perspective beyond that. 
To engage with bodies around reproduction, while challenging the 
powerful notion of Cartesian dualism, I have considered men, women, 
and the fetus as the minimum and necessary central actors. I have also 
suggested that starting a theory from reproduction, rather than adopting 
the assumptions of Cartesian dualism and treating reproduction as an 
exceptional phenomenon, may open up new possibilities in reconfiguring 
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the conceptualization of the body. However, I feel the bridging of the 
notions of production and reproduction may entail problematics that could 
be a source of a serious epistemic violence. Below, I address some of 
potential issues. 
First, theorizing body from reproduction privileges bodies that are 
capable of reproduction and excludes or marginalizes bodies that do not 
reproduce. An increasing number of women are forgoing motherhood, and 
the patterns of life course and family formation have been diversified. Yet 
individuals with no children face stigma (Park 2002; Rich et al. 2001), and 
there is a need to critically engage with the possibility that such approach 
might further stigmatize childfree/childless adults, or it might be used to 
endorse normative notions of the family.  
A related issue has to do with the danger of essentialism. Historically, 
feminist social scientists have strategically moved away from the body 
and emphasized the social to avoid essentialism. While the expanding 
scholarship on bodies is a welcome change, feminist theory of bodies 
must not be mere modifications of the old notion of essentialism. Critical 
reflexivity would be required in theorization of bodies around reproduction. 
Second, there is a need to carefully consider what it means to theorize 
the idea of bodies as what it produce, and the continuity of production and 
reproduction. In the context of the global economy, where commodification 
of the body generates a tremendous amount of profit for some, at the 
expense of exploitation of other bodies (Deonandan et al. 2012; Whittaker 
and Speier 2010), we need to be careful with how we theorize such 
sensitive issues. In the field of reproductive practices, egg and sperm 
“donation,” as well as surrogacy are gaining popularity. Together with 
various reproductive technologies, the meaning of reproduction itself has 
been changing rapidly, and it appears reproduction has already become 
“productive,” lucrative enterprise in global capitalism. 
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Finally, in this paper, I could not leave much room for the discussions 
of bodily difference beyond gender. I have not considered the bodies 
and other categories of social differences including race, class, and more 
broadly, culture. In her book, too, while Grosz states “The body must be 
regarded as a site of social, political, cultural, and geographical inscriptions, 
production, or constitution” (1994:23), and repeatedly argues for the idea of 
the body as a cultural product, she did not make a strong case of how this 
was so. An elucidation of the workings of culture in the body may be one 
way in which the field of the body studies can be further enriched. 
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